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INTRODUCTION
After receiving verdicts of not guilty by reason of insanity, John
McGee and Ronald Manlen were committed to Michigan mental hos1
pitals.
The center for forensic psychiatry later determined that
McGee and Manlen were “no longer mentally ill and dangerous” and
2
released them. Shortly after being released, McGee kicked his wife to
3
4
death and Manlen raped two women.
The public outcry that followed these tragic events prompted the
Michigan legislature to statutorily authorize the “guilty but mentally
ill” (GBMI) verdict in cases where a defendant raises the insanity de5
fense. The verdict permits the jury to find that although the defendant is mentally ill, she is not legally insane, and she may be given a
full criminal sentence. A defendant who receives a GBMI verdict must
6
receive appropriate psychiatric treatment while imprisoned.
Several other states, faced with similar high-profile crimes committed by released insanity acquittees, also adopted the GBMI ver-
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Sharon Morey Brown & Nicholas J. Wittner, Criminal Law, 25 WAYNE L. REV. 335,
356-57 (1979).
2
Id. at 357.
3
Id.
4
Id. (citing George D. Mesritz, Comment, Guilty but Mentally Ill: An Historical and
Constitutional Analysis, 53 J. URB. L. 471, 483 (1976)).
5
Id. (citing MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.36 (West Supp. 1978)).
6
Id.
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dict. Some state legislatures considered the complete abolition of
8
the insanity defense, while others heightened the requirements for
9
release from post-insanity acquittal commitment (PIAC) or imple10
mented conditional release programs.
This Comment evaluates the current methods employed by states
to cope with insanity acquittee recidivists and proposes a new solution
that strikes a balance between rehabilitating insane offenders and protecting the public from dangerous acquittees. Part I evaluates the basic problem of insanity acquittee recidivism and explores the roles
played by inaccurate release decisions and post-release medication
noncompliance in exacerbating the problem. Part II addresses various approaches adopted by state legislatures and courts to deal with
insanity acquittee recidivism. This Comment will argue that these approaches are impractical, inequitable, or unconstitutional. Finally, in
Part III, this Comment proposes a new method of minimizing insanity
acquittee recidivism: abolishing the insanity defense for acquittee recidivists who are deemed sane upon release and who subsequently fail
to abide by their post-release treatment regimen.

7

See, e.g., Vicki L. Plaut, Punishment Versus Treatment of the Guilty but Mentally Ill, 74
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 428, 435 (1983) (“[P]ublic outrage over post-release criminal behavior by two insanity acquittees spurred the creation of Illinois’ guilty but mentally ill alternative.”); Christopher Slobogin, The Guilty but Mentally Ill Verdict: An Idea
Whose Time Should Not Have Come, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 494, 498 n.18 (1985) (“[A]
precipitating factor behind Georgia’s guilty but mentally ill legislation was a multiple
murder commited [sic] by an insanity acquittee shortly after his release.” (citing NAT’L
CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, THE “GUILTY BUT MENTALLY ILL” PLEA AND VERDICT: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY: FINAL REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 2-3 (working draft Nov. 15, 1984) (on file with the George Washington Law Review))).
8
See, e.g., Lisa Callahan, Connie Mayer & Henry J. Steadman, Insanity Defense Reform in the United States—Post-Hinckley, 11 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 54, 5459 (1987) (discussing insanity defense reforms considered by legislatures after John
Hinckley was acquitted by reason of insanity for the attempted assassination of President Reagan); Cynthia A. Hagan, Commentary, The Insanity Defense: A Review of Recent
Statutory Changes, 3 J. LEGAL MED. 617, 618 (1982) (explaining that the Idaho legislature abolished the insanity defense because of the public outrage over an attempted
murder committed by an insanity acquittee); Ira Mickenberg, A Pleasant Surprise: The
Guilty but Mentally Ill Verdict Has Both Succeeded in Its Own Right and Successfully Preserved
the Traditional Role of the Insanity Defense, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 943, 972 (1987) (“Within
two weeks of . . . shootings [by an insanity acquittee], proposals were introduced in the
[Alaska] state legislature to abolish or restrict the use of the insanity defense . . . .”).
9
See infra Part II.A.1 (detailing two approaches adopted by states: evaluating an
acquittee for release in an unmedicated state, and taking the likelihood of medication
compliance into account in making release decisions).
10
See infra Part II.A.2.
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I. THE PROBLEM OF INSANITY ACQUITTEE RECIDIVISM
Insanity acquittee recidivism is a problem of grave concern for
both the criminal justice system and the mental health profession. Although “[i]nsanity acquittees have been the focus of intense study”
11
since the mid-1970s, researchers have found it difficult to determine
12
precise meta-analysis recidivism rates. One source of difficulty is that
the actual definition of recidivism varies significantly from study to
study: some researchers define recidivism broadly, including any incidents of rehospitalization based on acts for which the acquittee
13
could have been rearrested; others define it more narrowly, only in14
cluding rearrests. Furthermore, “[l]ocal and jurisdictional nuances
15
[may] have a dramatic effect on the rate[s] of rearrest,” thereby
making it more difficult for researchers to deduce statistical trends
from the recidivism data available.
Despite the methodological inconsistencies among the studies,
one general conclusion may be drawn. The recidivism rate of insanity
acquittees roughly corresponds to the recidivism rate of the general
16
prison population.
Thus, many of the standard risk factors commonly employed to predict criminal recidivism are equally applicable

11

Victoria L. Harris, Insanity Acquittees and Rearrest: The Past 24 Years, 28 J. AM.
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 225, 225 (2000).
12
See id. at 229-30 (“Numerous articles have commented on the difficulty of comparing the rearrest rates of insanity acquittees.”).
13
See, e.g., Marnie E. Rice & Grant T. Harris, A Comparison of Criminal Recidivism
Among Schizophrenic and Nonschizophrenic Offenders, 15 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 397, 404
(1992) (defining recidivism as including “any acts which brought the offender back to
[the] hospital, but for which the offender could have been criminally charged”).
14
See, e.g., Harris, supra note 11, at 230 (noting that rehospitalizing (rather than
rearresting) an offender poses problems for recidivism analysis).
15
Id.
16
See In re George L., 648 N.E.2d 475, 480 (N.Y. 1995) (“[The] recidivism rate [of
insanity acquittees is] equal to that of prison populations.” (quoting Warren J. Ingber,
Note, Rules for an Exceptional Class: The Commitment and Release of Persons Acquitted of Violent Offenses by Reason of Insanity, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 281, 296 (1982))); Harris, supra note
11, at 230 (“In studies spanning decades, the rearrest rates of released insanity acquittees are as high as those persons released from jail and prison.”); Mark L. Pantle et al.,
Comparing Institutionalization Periods and Subsequent Arrests of Insanity Acquittees and Convicted Felons, 8 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 305, 313 (1980) (finding a twenty-four percent recidivism rate for insanity acquittees and a twenty-seven percent recidivism rate for convicted felons over a six-year period). But see Mary Robinson, The Insanity Defense: Does It
Serve Justice? Does It Protect the Public?, 71 ILL. B.J. 306, 309 (1983) (describing the
statements of Dr. Jay LeBow, a panelist at an Illinois Bar Association forum on the insanity defense, who asserted that the recidivism rate of insanity acquittees is substantially lower than the recidivism rate of convicted defendants).
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to insanity acquittees. Past criminal violence is of particular salience
as “the clinical consensus is that a history of violent behavior in an in18
dividual is the single best predictor of future violence.”
This suggests that an insanity acquittee’s history of prior violence—and not her mental illness per se—will increase the likelihood
that she will act violently in the future. If, as many researchers assert,
insanity acquittees as a class are no more violent than convicted de19
fendants, then the similarity between the recidivism rates makes
sense: “the number and nature of prior violent acts,” and not one’s
20
diagnosis, is the most accurate predictor of future violence. However, several important factors distinguish imprisonment from PIAC
and make the insanity acquittee recidivism rate more troubling.
First, state legislatures have adopted various statutes to deal with
21
the problem of convicted recidivists. By 1992, the federal system and
all fifty states had enacted some form of sentence-enhancing recidi22
vism statute.
Although the effectiveness of such laws is hotly de23
bated, the fact remains that institutional mechanisms are in place to
deal with repeat convicted offenders. Under a “three strikes law,” for
example, a third-time convicted felon generally will be subjected to a
24
substantially longer term of imprisonment.
17

See Harris, supra note 11, at 226 (“[R]earrest among insanity acquittees [is]
likely to be influenced by factors that influence repetitive criminal behavior . . . . Past
criminal behavior, age, and gender have consistently been shown to be highly influential factors in the determination of future criminal behavior.”).
18
Ingber, supra note 16, at 295.
19
See Bernard L. Diamond, The Psychiatric Prediction of Dangerousness, 123 U. PA. L.
REV. 439, 448 (1974) (noting “the lack of a clear-cut association between mental illness . . . and dangerous behavior”); Slobogin, supra note 7, at 504 (“[T]here is only a
very weak correlation between severe mental illness and violent behavior . . . .”).
20
Slobogin, supra note 7, at 504. But see Ingber, supra note 16, at 297 (“[V]iolent
insanity acquittees comprise a particularly dangerous class of individuals.”).
21
See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-7.1 (West 2005) (providing that certain thirdtime offenders will be sentenced to life imprisonment with no eligibility for parole);
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.10 (McKinney 1998) (providing sentence enhancement for “persistent felony offender[s]”); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9714 (West Supp. 2005) (providing for minimum ten-year sentences for violent recidivists).
22
See Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 26-27 (1992) (“[Sentence-enhancing recidivism]
laws currently are in effect in all 50 states and several have been enacted by the Federal
Government, as well.” (citations omitted)).
23
See, e.g., Daniel Katkin, Habitual Offender Laws: A Reconsideration, 21 BUFF. L.
REV. 99, 105 (1971) (arguing that recidivism statutes fail both to deter repeat offenders
and to protect the public adequately).
24
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 667(b) (West 1999); Ewing v. California, 538
U.S. 11, 20, 30-32 (2003) (upholding the defendant’s sentence of twenty-five years to
life for stealing three golf clubs under California’s three strikes law); State v. Oliver,
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In contrast, there is no similar guarantee of incapacitation in the
context of insanity acquittee recidivists. Most likely, a reoffending acquittee will be reinstitutionalized. Unlike the statutorily imposed sentence enhancement that a convicted recidivist will receive, however,
25
the length of an acquittee’s confinement is far less definite. Perhaps
a court will consider an acquittee’s past recidivism when it eventually
decides whether or not to release her. However, recidivism will be
only one factor among many that the court will take into account in
assessing the current dangerousness of an acquittee and her suitability
26
for release.
Furthermore, and perhaps most significantly, consideration of recidivism in a release decision may raise constitutional issues that will
prevent the continued confinement of an insanity acquittee who still
poses a danger to society. In Foucha v. Louisiana, the United States
Supreme Court held that under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a state may not continue to hold an insanity acquittee who is still considered dangerous but is no longer mentally
27
ill. The Court reiterated the rule it set forth in Jones v. United States
that a “‘committed acquittee is entitled to release when he has recovered his sanity or is no longer dangerous,’ i.e., [that] the acquittee
may be held as long as he is both mentally ill and dangerous, but no
28
longer.” Thus, if a judge were to prolong an insanity acquittee’s confinement solely because the acquittee was a known recidivist, such action would violate Foucha if the acquittee were no longer considered
29
mentally ill. Therefore, although recidivism will generally guarantee
745 A.2d 1165, 1167-68 (N.J. 2000) (affirming a third-time offender’s sentence of life
imprisonment without parole after he was convicted of first degree robbery and aggravated assault under New Jersey’s three strikes law).
25
Because an insanity acquittee may only be committed so long as she is both mentally ill and dangerous, Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 368 (1983), the length of
an acquittee’s confinement is unpredictable: she may be committed for only a few
weeks or perhaps indefinitely. See, e.g., People v. Pastewski, 647 N.E.2d 278, 283 (Ill.
1995) (allowing an acquittee’s past recidivism to enhance his maximum commitment
period, but noting that the acquittee “may be released anytime he regains his sanity”).
26
See, e.g., In re George L., 648 N.E.2d 475, 481 (N.Y. 1995) (listing a “history of
prior relapses into violent behavior” as one type of evidence to be considered in determining if an acquittee currently poses a danger to herself or others).
27
504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992) (citing Jones, 463 U.S. at 362).
28
Foucha, 504 U.S. at 77 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Jones, 463 U.S. at 368).
29
See, e.g., In re Gafford, 903 P.2d 61, 65 (Idaho 1995) (holding that a state statute
permitting acquittees to be confined on the basis of dangerousness alone violated
Foucha). But see State v. Randall, 532 N.W.2d 94, 106-07 (Wis. 1995) (interpreting
Foucha to permit the continued confinement of an insanity acquittee based on dangerousness alone, as long as the commitment is limited to the maximum term the acquit-
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a longer sentence for a convicted offender, the role recidivism will
play in determining the length of an acquittee’s confinement is less
definitive.
A second factor that distinguishes insanity acquittee recidivism
from convicted offender recidivism—and makes the similarity in recidivism rates more troubling—is that PIAC focuses on treating the
problems of acquittees, whereas ordinary imprisonment does not spe30
cifically seek to rehabilitate prisoners.
In Jones, Justice Powell observed that PIAC is intended to “treat the individual’s mental illness
31
and protect him and society from his potential dangerousness.”
Thus, one would hope that when the acquittee is eventually released
from confinement (i.e., she is no longer considered both mentally ill
and dangerous), many of the problems that resulted in commitment
32
would be resolved, or at the very least, substantially improved. The
rehabilitation efforts of the PIAC system should, in theory, improve
the irrational thought process that led the acquittee to commit criminal acts that resulted in her initial commitment. The same hope cannot be fostered with regard to the prison system, which values retribu33
tion and incapacitation over the rehabilitation of inmates. American
34
prisons “rehabilitate[] no one.” Rather, “[m]ost criminal offenders
35
who change for the better do so in spite of prison not because of it.”
If PIAC treats the acquittee’s underlying problems and imprisonment merely punishes and confines convicts, what accounts for the

tee would have received if convicted and the commitment statute is reasonably related
to the purpose for which the acquittee is committed).
30
See Sharon M. Bunzel, Note, The Probation Officer and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Strange Philosophical Bedfellows, 104 YALE L.J. 933, 952 (1995) (“[I]n light of current knowledge . . . imprisonment is not an appropriate means of promoting correction and rehabilitation. . . . [A]lmost everyone involved in the criminal justice system
now doubts that rehabilitation can be induced reliably in a prison setting . . . . [N]o
one can really detect whether or when a prisoner is rehabilitated.” (internal quotation
marks omitted) (footnotes omitted) (quoting S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 38, 76 (1983))).
31
Jones, 463 U.S. at 368.
32
See Stephen J. Morse, Blame and Danger: An Essay on Preventive Detention, 76 B.U.
L. REV. 113, 128 n.44 (1996) (noting that in cases of extreme mental illness, medication can reduce the risk of further violence by “ameliorating the crazy thinking”).
33
See, e.g., Richard Lowell Nygaard, Crime, Pain, and Punishment: A Skeptic’s View,
102 DICK. L. REV. 355, 363 (1998) (“The ugly truth is that we punish because it makes
us feel good to get even.”); Debra Todd, Sentencing of Adult Offenders in Cases Involving
Sexual Abuse of Children: Too Little, Too Late? A View from the Pennsylvania Bench, 109
PENN ST. L. REV. 487, 518 (2004) (citing the argument that “America has never truly
been committed to [the] rehabilitation” of criminals).
34
Nygaard, supra note 33, at 362.
35
Id. at 362-63.
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similar rates of post-release recidivism among the two groups of offenders? The premature release of insanity acquittees and postrelease medication noncompliance are two possible explanations.
A. Inaccurate, Premature Release Decisions
An acquittee must be released from PIAC when she is adjudged
36
no longer to be both mentally ill and dangerous. Expert testimony
regarding the acquittee’s current mental health and future danger37
ousness will often be decisive in the release decision. However, the
ability of experts to predict accurately the mental stability and safety of
an acquittee upon release from the hospital is questionable. Studies
38
on expert risk assessment suggest different rates of accuracy, the
most favorable study reporting that expert predictions are correct just
39
over fifty percent of the time. Thus, approximately half of all insanity acquittees will either be prematurely released or unnecessarily confined.
Although the development of more advanced actuarial risk as40
sessment tools may improve the accuracy of experts’ predictions, inherent limitations remain that will inevitably produce some inaccurate
decisions. No expert can account for every future precipitating factor
that may cause an insanity acquittee to decompensate and act dangerously. The mind is exceedingly complex, and psychological diseases
are not amenable to precise scientific explanation. Thus, even the
most experienced expert, utilizing the most advanced tools, will find it

36

Jones, 463 U.S. at 368.
Many state statutes require that mental health professionals evaluate the acquittee and report their findings to the court before a release decision is made. See, e.g.,
HAW. REV. STAT. § 704–414 (Supp. 2004) (requiring that three experts examine the
defendant prior to conditional release); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 330.20 (McKinney
Supp. 2004) (mandating submission of a psychiatrist’s report before a defendant can
be released).
38
See, e.g., JOHN MONAHAN, THE CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 47
(1981) (“[P]sychiatrists and psychologists are accurate in no more than one out of
three predictions of violent behavior . . . .” (emphasis omitted)); Joseph T. McCann,
Risk Assessment and the Prediction of Violent Behavior, FED. LAW., Oct. 1997, at 18, 18 (stating that predictions of mental health professionals are “better than chance”).
39
See Charles W. Lidz et al., The Accuracy of Predictions of Violence to Others, 269 J. AM.
MED. ASS’N 1007, 1009 (1993) (“[C]linicians were above chance in their predictions of
violence (equivalently, we can reject the null hypothesis that sensitivity and specificity
equaled 50%).”).
40
Id. at 1010-11.
37
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difficult to assess the future behavior of many acquittees. This is particularly true when the only context in which the acquittee has been
observed is the safe, controlled environment of the hospital.
Although inaccurate release decisions certainly affect the rate of
insanity acquittee recidivism, solutions to this problem are beyond the
42
scope of this Comment, which focuses on post-release means of reducing recidivism.
B. Post-Release Medication Noncompliance
Professor Stephen Morse has opined that “[i]n the case of seriously crazy people, whose irrational practical reasoning leads to the
intent to do harm, ameliorating the crazy thinking through proper
43
medication should in fact reduce the risk of harmdoing.” If Morse’s
postulation is accurate, then what accounts for the recidivism of insanity acquittees after they have been released from the hospital and their
sanity presumably has been restored?
The most sensible explanation is that many insanity acquittees fail
to abide by the treatment regimen developed for them while they
were hospitalized. For a mentally ill individual, medication compli-

41

See Diamond, supra note 19, at 452 (“Neither psychiatrists nor other behavioral
scientists are able to predict the occurrence of violent behavior with sufficient reliability . . . .”); Michael L. Perlin, Unpacking the Myths: The Symbolism Mythology of Insanity
Defense Jurisprudence, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 599, 693 (1990) (“The voluminous literature examining the ability of psychiatrists (or other mental health professionals) to
predict dangerousness in the indeterminate future has been virtually unanimous: ‘psychiatrists have absolutely no expertise in predicting dangerous behavior . . . .’” (footnote omitted) (quoting Bruce J. Ennis & Thomas R. Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CAL. L. REV. 693, 734-35 (1974))).
42
Some commentators have argued for the wholesale exclusion of expert testimony on the issue of future dangerousness. See, e.g., Diamond, supra note 19, at 452
(contending that experts should not be permitted to testify that an acquittee is dangerous, but rather that experts should only be permitted to give their opinions on the
relationship between the acquittee’s dangerousness and mental illness, as well as the
effectiveness of a treatment program in remedying the acquittee’s dangerousness).
Others have argued that experts should only be permitted to make predictions if they
are based on “hard, methodologically sound quantitative data” rather than clinical
judgment. E.g., Stephen J. Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals, and Science: An Analysis of
Mental Health Law, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 527, 620 (1978). For another proposed solution
to the problem of inaccurate expert predictions, see Slobogin, supra note 7, at 527
n.158 (advocating a rule that would allow the admission of clinical predictions of dangerousness only if the defendant introduces expert testimony on the issue first).
43
Morse, supra note 32, at 128 n.44.
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ance is the most effective means of avoiding relapse. Frequently, an
acquittee’s failure to consistently take her medication results in a “revolving door” patient:
After being involuntarily hospitalized and stabilized on medication, such
patients no longer meet the dangerous criterion for commitment.
Sometime after release, however, they start to question both the value
and necessity of their medications and eventually stop taking them. Predictably, their condition deteriorates to the point at which they again require inpatient care. For too many patients, this becomes a vicious cycle
45
that is never broken.

Such patients, once released into society, are essentially “time bombs
46
ready to explode.”
A number of reasons may explain an insanity acquittee’s failure to
continue her course of medication after leaving the hospital. The
most commonly cited include “the many unpleasant side effects present in most of the medications, forgetfulness, a feeling of improved
condition due to the medications that makes [her] believe [she] is no
47
longer ill, . . . or a simple desire not to be medicated.” Although
many patients may harbor negative attitudes toward antipsychotic
medication, medication compliance is an indispensable feature of reducing insanity acquittee recidivism, and is a main focus of this Comment.
II. CURRENT APPROACHES TO REDUCING
INSANITY ACQUITTEE RECIDIVISM
Current efforts to reduce insanity acquittee recidivism may be divided into two general categories: those that seek to enhance postrelease medication compliance directly, and those that attack the validity of the insanity defense itself.

44

See Veronica J. Manahan, When Our System of Involuntary Civil Commitment Fails
Individuals with Mental Illness: Russell Weston and the Case for Effective Monitoring and
Medication Delivery Mechanisms, 28 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 1, 20 (2004) (“Systems that are
successful in keeping individuals with mental illness out of the hospital have found
medication compliance to be the single most important factor in achieving such success.”).
45
Ronald L. Wisor Jr., Community Care, Competition and Coercion: A Legal Perspective
on Privatized Mental Health Care, 19 AM. J.L. & MED. 145, 159-60 (1993) (footnotes omitted).
46
Brown & Wittner, supra note 1, at 356 (quoting DETROIT NEWS, Oct. 1, 1978, at
47).
47
Manahan, supra note 44, at 20 (footnote omitted).
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A. Approaches Aimed at Enhancing Medication Compliance
Since the advent of psychotropic medication, states have grappled
with the problem of ensuring that insanity acquittees abide by their
treatment regimens after release. Two primary methods of dealing
with medication noncompliance have gained popular support in a
number of states: taking medication compliance into account in making release decisions, and implementing conditional release programs.
1. Taking Medication Compliance into Account
in Making Release Decisions
Courts that take medication compliance into account in making
release decisions will assess the acquittee’s sanity and dangerousness
by (1) evaluating the acquittee in an unmedicated state, or (2) defining dangerousness in terms of post-release medication compliance.
a. Evaluating the Acquittee in an Unmedicated State
In an effort to minimize insanity acquittee recidivism, a minority
of courts, in making release determinations, will consider whether the
acquittee’s mental stability or nondangerousness is solely dependent
upon continued compliance with a medication regimen. In State v.
Zarrella, a Rhode Island superior court held that when deciding if an
acquittee should be released from PIAC, “medication and treatment
should [not] be considered on the issue of either present sanity or
48
dangerousness.”
Although adopting such an approach will most likely reduce insanity acquittee recidivism, it is highly problematic because it will result in the indefinite commitment of a significant number of acquittees who are capable of functioning safely in society if properly
medicated. A substantial percentage of insanity acquittees suffer from
49
a psychotic mental disorder. Psychosis refers to a mental state char-

48

No. P2/82-1885, 1984 WL 560319, at *4 (R.I. Super. Ct. June 19, 1984); see also
State v. Johnson, 753 P.2d 154, 157 (Ariz. 1988) (stating that although the defendant’s
schizophrenia was in remission because of treatment, the court would still consider
him to be suffering from a mental illness); People v. De Anda, 114 Cal. App. 3d 480,
490 (Ct. App. 1980) (holding that in an initial commitment hearing for an insanity acquittee, “psychopharmaceutical restoration of sanity should not be considered a ‘full’
recovery”).
49
See Richard A. Pasewark et al., Characteristics and Disposition of Persons Found Not
Guilty by Reason of Insanity in New York State, 1971-1976, 136 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 655, 658
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acterized by a gross loss of contact with reality, and it is a feature of
various mental disorders, including schizophrenia, schizoaffective dis50
order, and delusional disorder.
Antipsychotic medications have a
51
“powerful ameliorative effect on active psychotic symptoms” and are
52
the most effective treatments known to date for such illnesses.
The average insanity acquittee will be treated with antipsychotic
53
medication during her post-acquittal commitment.
In most cases,
54
after an initial phase of trial and error, the treating medical professionals will settle upon an effective course of medication that successfully alleviates or substantially reduces the patient’s psychotic symp55
toms and ultimately restores her sanity.
Requiring such a patient to demonstrate her sanity in an unmedicated state will likely be unsuccessful. The mental health community
has yet to develop an effective, nonpharmacological means of restor56
ing a psychotic patient’s mental health. Thus, it will essentially be
impossible for a substantial number of acquittees ever to establish
their sanity if they are evaluated without medication. “[I]t is senseless
to deny persons fully functional on medication their rightful place in

(1979) (finding that approximately seventy percent of insanity acquittees studied in
New York between 1971 and 1976 suffered from psychosis); Jeffrey L. Rogers et al., Insanity Defenses: Contested or Conceded?, 141 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 885, 886 (1984) (noting
that seventy percent of insanity acquittees in Oregon between 1978 and 1981 suffered
from psychosis).
50
See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DSM-IV-TR: DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL
OF MENTAL DISORDERS 312, 323, 329 (4th ed. 2000) (listing the diagnostic criteria for
schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, and delusional disorder).
51
Marnie E. Rice et al., Treatment for Forensic Patients, in MENTAL HEALTH AND LAW:
RESEARCH, POLICY AND SERVICES 141, 169 (Bruce D. Sales & Saleem A. Shah eds.,
1996).
52
See MELISSA K. SPEAKING, NAT’L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, SCHIZOPHRENIA 13
(Aug. 2002), available at http://www.nimh.nih.gov/publicat/NIMHschizoph.pdf (“Antipsychotic drugs are the best treatment [for schizophrenia] now available . . . .”); cf.
Manahan, supra note 44, at 20 (“[S]ixty to seventy-five percent of [schizophrenics] who
stop taking their [antipsychotic] medication relapse within a year’s time.”).
53
One of the main goals of PIAC is treatment of the acquittee’s mental illness.
Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 368 (1983). Medication is an essential component
of treatment. See People v. Williams, 198 Cal. App. 3d 1476, 1482 (Ct. App. 1988) (noting that the purpose of PIAC is treatment “including medication”).
54
See RALPH REISNER ET AL., LAW AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM: CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL ASPECTS 27-28 (4th ed. 2004) (“The neuroleptic of choice for any given patient must be determined to a considerable degree by trial and error.”).
55
See id. at 38 (noting that traditional antipsychotic medication will help seventyfive percent of schizophrenics improve).
56
Cf. SPEAKING, supra note 52, at 17 (noting “[f]ar higher relapse rates . . . when
medication is discontinued”).
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57

the community . . . .”
Moreover, evaluating acquittees in an unmedicated state provides acquittees with the perverse incentive to
58
“gamble” with their mental health and stop taking their medication.
This is an inappropriate and ineffective response to the recidivism dilemma.
In addition, assessing the sanity of the acquittee in an unmedicated state is inconsistent with the way the law evaluates mentally disordered offenders in other contexts. When determining if a defendant is competent to stand trial or face execution, many courts do not
differentiate between unmedicated competence and medicated com59
petence. In fact, the Supreme Court has held that under certain circumstances, states may forcibly medicate an incompetent defendant
60
for the sole purpose of restoring her competence to stand trial.
Admittedly, competency and sanity are different mental condi61
tions, and states are not compelled to adopt uniform standards to

57

Williams, 198 Cal. App. 3d at 1482.
Id.
59
See, e.g., Singleton v. Norris, 319 F.3d 1018, 1027 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that
restoring an inmate’s competency to be executed by medicating him did not violate
the Eighth Amendment or principles of due process); State v. Hampton, 218 So. 2d
311, 312 (La. 1969) (observing that to find a defendant incompetent to stand trial
merely because her competence was chemically induced would “erase improvement[s]
produced by medical science”).
60
In Sell v. United States, the Supreme Court held that “the Constitution permits
the Government involuntarily to administer antipsychotic drugs to a mentally ill defendant facing serious criminal charges in order to render that defendant competent
to stand trial.” 539 U.S. 166, 179 (2003). In order to forcibly medicate, the following
conditions must be met: (1) the treatment must be medically appropriate; (2) the
treatment must be “substantially unlikely to have side effects that may undermine the
fairness of the trial”; and (3) taking into account less intrusive alternatives, the treatment must be “necessary significantly to further important governmental trial-related
interests.” Id. The Supreme Court has yet to decide whether the state may forcibly
medicate a mentally ill defendant for the sole purpose of restoring the defendant’s
competence to be executed. Lower courts are divided on the issue. Compare Singleton,
319 F.3d at 1024-25 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that under certain circumstances an incompetent defendant may be forcibly medicated in order to restore her competence
to be executed), with State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 761 (La. 1992) (ruling, with some
consideration of United States Supreme Court precedent that interprets analogous
provisions of the United States Constitution, that the forcible medication of an incompetent defendant for the sole purpose of restoring competence to be executed is cruel
and unusual punishment under Louisiana’s constitution).
61
A person may be sane but incompetent, or competent but insane. To be found
competent to stand trial, the defendant must be able to reasonably assist counsel and
must possess “a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against
him.” Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (internal quotation marks
omitted). The test for insanity varies among jurisdictions. The federal test provides
58
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govern both of them. Furthermore, from a pragmatic viewpoint, it
makes perfect sense to evaluate a defendant’s competence in a medicated state but to assess an acquittee’s sanity in an unmedicated state;
public safety is implicated in the latter context, but not the former.
However, the mere fact that states are permitted to forcibly administer
antipsychotic drugs to incompetent defendants suggests that psychotropic medication plays an invaluable role in restoring the mental
health of mentally ill individuals. It is inconsistent to allow the state to
benefit from the effectiveness of antipsychotic medication in the
competency context, but to withhold the same benefit from the acquittee in the insanity release context.
b. Assessing Future Dangerousness in Terms of Post-Release Medication Compliance
Other courts have concluded that an insanity acquittee’s likelihood of complying with a treatment program and her history of prior
relapses are appropriate factors to consider when determining if the
62
acquittee should be released. The Nebraska legislature considered a
similar approach in 1993 by proposing a bill that purported to
“make[] failure to comply with treatment or to take prescribed medication appropriate evidence for the court to consider in assessing [an
63
acquittee’s] dangerousness.”
Considering whether an acquittee is likely to comply with a treatment regimen is a logical means of minimizing insanity acquittee recidivism. If post-release medication noncompliance substantially contributes to such recidivism, then courts should be able to take this
factor into account when determining whether an insanity acquittee
will pose a danger to society upon release. In practice, however, prethat a defendant is legally insane if “the defendant, as a result of a severe mental disease or defect, was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of
his acts.” 18 U.S.C. § 17 (2000).
62
See Williams v. Wallis, 734 F.2d 1434, 1437-38 n.4 (11th Cir. 1984) (“[I]f an acquittee is no longer dangerous only because he or she is on medication or in a structured environment, then clearly whether he or she will take his or her medication or
be in a structured environment after release can and should be considered prior to
release.”); State v. Rambin, 427 So. 2d 1248, 1253 (La. Ct. App. 1983) (denying the acquittee’s application for release from PIAC because, among other reasons, he exhibited a propensity to resist medication); In re Francis S., 663 N.E.2d 881, 884 (N.Y. 1995)
(noting that, in making release decisions, courts may take into account an acquittee’s
“history of prior relapses into violent behavior and of recurrent substance abuse and
noncompliance with treatment programs”).
63
Sherin S. Vitro, Comment, Promoting Therepeutic Objectives Through LB 518: A
Sane Amendment to Nebraska Law Governing the Disposition of Insanity Acquittees, 72 NEB. L.
REV. 837, 856 (1993). The bill was never signed into law.
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dicting whether an acquittee will continue to take her medication is
quite difficult and may result in the unjustified and inequitable confinement of acquittees. As Part I.A discussed, mental health experts
often make inaccurate predictions and, if anything, tend to overpre64
dict the future dangerousness of insanity acquittees.
Moreover, courts often rely on weak evidence in predicting future
compliance, particularly in the case of first-time insanity acquittees
where courts do not have a history of compliance to consider in evalu65
ating the acquittee.
For example, in State v. Perez, the Supreme
Court of Louisiana held that an insanity acquittee’s petition for conditional release was properly denied because if the acquittee “stop[ped]
taking [her] medication, [she] could become mentally ill again . . .
66
[and] could discontinue [her] medication at any time.” But the fact
that an insanity acquittee could stop taking her medication at any time
merely establishes that the acquittee has free will. It does not establish
that, if released, an acquittee would stop taking her medication. Refusing to release an acquittee on the basis of such tenuous evidence is
inequitable, particularly in the case of Ricky Perez, who, as the evidence established, had been “a model patient for over eleven years”
and had “successfully functioned in society as a peaceful, law abiding
67
citizen while on many weekend and ten day passes.”
Furthermore, in the cases in which an insanity acquittee has al68
ready been deemed sane, it is unnecessary to assess the acquittee’s
dangerousness and thus take medication compliance into account.
64

See Donald H.J. Hermann, Barriers to Providing Effective Treatment: A Critique of
Revisions in Procedural, Substantive, and Dispositional Criteria in Involuntary Civil Commitment, 39 VAND. L. REV. 83, 98 (1986) (“Empirical studies reveal that psychiatrists and
sociologists are notoriously inaccurate at predicting dangerousness and in fact have a
pronounced tendency to overpredict.”); Morse, supra note 42, at 598 (“Nearly always,
professionals err in the direction of overpredicting the occurrence of legally relevant behavior, of overproducing false positives.”); Henry J. Steadman & Joseph Cocozza, Psychiatry, Dangerousness and the Repetitively Violent Offender, 69 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
226, 231 (1978) (“Psychiatrists can demonstrate no special expertise in making predictions of future violent behavior.”).
65
Courts frequently stress the importance of an acquittee’s history of compliance
or noncompliance when making release decisions. See, e.g., State v. Dudley, 903 S.W.2d
581, 587 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (listing “whether the individual has a successful history of
taking medication while on conditional release” as an important factor to consider
when making a release determination).
66
563 So. 2d 841, 845 (La. 1990).
67
Id. at 846 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
68
Although an acquittee may have regained her sanity because of medication, this
should not prevent her from being deemed sane for the purpose of release from PIAC.
See supra Part II.A.1.a.
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Only the concurrent presence of a mental illness and dangerousness
69
justifies continued confinement under PIAC. Thus, as the dissenting
opinion in Perez noted, if an acquittee such as Mr. Perez no longer suffers from a mental illness, then the “propensity for danger alone is not
70
[a] sufficient constitutional basis for [his continued] confinement.”
Although courts may certainly take medication compliance into
account in assessing the dangerousness of an insanity acquittee, they
should (1) only base their predictions on substantiated evidence, such
as an acquittee’s prior history of noncompliance or express “threats of
71
future noncompliance,” and (2) only make such predictions when
dangerousness is a constitutionally relevant issue (i.e., when the acquittee has not been deemed sane).
2. Implementing Conditional Release Programs
72

73

In recent years, a number of states and Congress have adopted
statutes providing for the conditional release of insanity acquittees
from the hospital. Conditional release statutes generally “authorize
the release of an insanity acquittee upon such conditions of medical
care or treatment as the court deems appropriate to ensure that the
acquittee will not present a danger to himself or others, such as a regi74
men of medication.” If an acquittee fails to abide by the prescribed
treatment regimen, the state may revoke the conditional release and
75
rehospitalize the acquittee.
Upon first glance, conditional release programs seem to be a logical response to the problem of insanity acquittee recidivism. Closer
examination of conditional releases, however, reveals that they can be
constitutionally problematic. Before evaluating the flaws of conditional release provisions, it is important to reiterate the constitutional
standard for PIAC: “[D]ue process requires that the nature and dura-

69

See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court’s
holding in Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992), that a state may not confine an
insanity acquittee who, though possibly dangerous, is no longer mentally ill).
70
Perez, 563 So. 2d at 846 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
71
In re George L., 648 N.E.2d 475, 481 (N.Y. 1995).
72
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1602–1603 (West 2000) (providing for conditional
release); HAW. REV. STAT. § 704-411 (1993 & Supp. 2000) (same).
73
See 18 U.S.C. § 4243(f) (2000) (establishing a federal conditional release provision).
74
21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 89 (1998) (footnote omitted).
75
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 4243(g) (2000) (providing for revocation of conditional
discharge).
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tion of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for
76
which the individual is committed.” In the PIAC context, the purpose for committing the acquittee is to deal nonpunitively with her
mental illness and dangerousness. Thus, if either the acquittee’s illness
or her dangerousness is alleviated, the state loses any interest in continuing to confine the acquittee under the rubric of PIAC. Insanity
and dangerousness are two distinct concepts and only their concur77
rent presence justifies commitment. All too often, courts and legislatures conflate the two concepts, defining insanity in terms of dan78
gerousness and vice versa.
Although insanity and dangerousness
may be interrelated in some individuals, that is not always the case; it
is perfectly plausible for a person to be sane and dangerous or insane
and nondangerous.
The conditional release of insanity acquittees can violate the constitutional standard for PIAC in a number of important ways. First,
under some conditional release statutes, an insanity acquittee must be
79
found nondangerous before the state will conditionally release her.
“[N]o trial judge in his or her right mind would release a patient to
outpatient status on the theory that, because of the supervision and
treatment the patient is supposed to receive, he or she will no longer
80
be dangerous to others.”

76

Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972).
See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court’s
holding in Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992), that a state may not confine an
insanity acquittee who, though possibly dangerous, is no longer mentally ill).
78
For example, the California conditional release statute defines sanity as no
longer being “a danger to the health and safety of others, due to mental defect, disease, or disorder.” CAL. PENAL CODE § 1026.2(e) (West Supp. 2005).
79
See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 552.040.14 (West 2002) (“No committed person shall
be conditionally released until it is determined that the committed person is not likely
to be dangerous to others while on conditional release.”). Some states do not require
a finding of nondangerousness before an acquittee may be conditionally released. For
example, Hawaii’s conditional release statute provides that if an acquittee is found to
be either nondangerous or not mentally ill, she must be unconditionally released. HAW.
REV. STAT. § 704-411 (1993 & Supp 2000). She may be conditionally released if she is
mentally ill and presents a danger to herself or others, but can be “controlled adequately and given proper care, supervision, and treatment.” Id. Hawaii’s conditional
release statute therefore meets the constitutional requirements set forth in Foucha because it requires both mental illness and dangerousness as a prerequisite to confinement.
80
Grant H. Morris, Placed in Purgatory: Conditional Release of Insanity Acquittees, 39
ARIZ. L. REV. 1061, 1107 (1997) (citing People v. Harner, 262 Cal. Rptr. 422, 431 (Ct.
App. 1989) (Kline, J., dissenting)).
77
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But, if the acquittee is adjudged nondangerous at the end of her
inpatient commitment, then the state has no further interest in limiting the acquittee’s liberty, as an inpatient or an outpatient. Although
the state may wish to monitor the acquittee to ensure that she is in fact
nondangerous, it may not do so by prolonging PIAC—even on an
outpatient basis—when the initial justificatory grounds for commitment (i.e., concurrent presence of insanity and dangerousness) no
longer exist. The state could resort to civil commitment if the requi81
site criteria were met, but PIAC of any form would no longer be
permissible.
Second, even if the initial conditional release could be construed
as constitutional, the revocation procedures followed in many states
certainly are not. The California statute governing revocation of conditional release does not require a finding of dangerousness before
82
the acquittee may be rehospitalized. In In re McPherson, an appellate
court in California held that the statute’s failure to require a finding
83
of dangerousness was not the result of a “legislative oversight.”
Rather, the court noted, the state may revoke an insanity acquittee’s
conditional release upon determining that the acquittee “requires extended inpatient treatment” or that she “refuses to accept further
84
outpatient treatment and supervision.” Under the California court’s
interpretation of the statute, therefore, dangerousness is not a pre85
requisite to recommitment.
In response to the California courts’ interpretation of the state’s
conditional release statute, the San Diego County Conditional Release
Program (CONREP) has revoked the conditional release status of ac86
quittees who never violated the law while they were outpatients.
Quite often, CONREP has based its revocation decisions on the suspi-

81

See infra note 91 (describing the criteria for involuntary civil commitment).
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1608 (West 2000) (providing for judicially determined
revocation when the treatment supervisor finds that the acquittee requires extended
inpatient treatment or refuses to accept further outpatient treatment and supervision).
83
176 Cal. App. 3d 332, 339 (Ct. App. 1985).
84
Id. (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 1608).
85
Although a finding of dangerousness is not a necessary prerequisite to revocation under the California conditional release statute, it is a permissible consideration.
See, e.g., People v. DeGuzman, 33 Cal. App. 4th 414, 420 (Ct. App. 1995) (upholding
the trial court’s decision to revoke an acquittee’s conditional release status in part because he “posed a possible danger to public safety”).
86
See Morris, supra note 80, at 1095 (noting cases in which CONREP recommended “revocation of outpatient status . . . for patients who had not engaged in
criminal activity”).
82
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cion that an insanity acquittee is no longer taking her antipsychotic
87
medication or regularly attending therapy sessions.
In one case,
“CONREP sought revocation of [an acquittee’s] outpatient status even
though the patient had not committed any criminal act or violated
88
any terms and conditions of his outpatient status.” In justifying the
revocation, CONREP asserted that the acquittee lacked insight into
89
his mental disorder and was “medically fragile.”
California’s approach to the revocation of an insanity acquittee’s
conditional release status is unconstitutional. As previously noted, the
state’s nonpunitive interest in confining and monitoring an insanity
acquittee is inextricably tied to the continued existence of a mental
disorder that renders the acquittee dangerous. If the acquittee is simply mentally ill, but not dangerous, the state’s PIAC interest is termi90
nated. The state may pursue civil commitment if its law permits the
involuntary commitment of a nondangerous mentally ill person for
91
the purpose of treatment. However, PIAC in any form for an acquittee who is no longer dangerous is impermissible.
A third critique of the conditional release system is that by “retain[ing] indeterminate control over insanity acquittees . . . [it] inflicts impermissible punishment” on a group of offenders who have
proven beyond a reasonable doubt that they are not criminally re92
sponsible. Most conditional release programs require that acquittees
live in a particular residence, take certain medications, receive therapy
at specified times and places, refrain from the use of alcohol and

87

See id. (describing revocation based on CONREP’s belief that an acquittee was
not receiving treatment).
88
Id. at 1096-97.
89
Id. at 1096.
90
See supra note 77 and accompanying text (stating the constitutional prerequisites for confinement).
91
Civil commitment is the involuntary treatment or care of mentally disabled persons outside of the criminal context. REISNER ET AL., supra note 54, at 666. Civil commitment laws come in two varieties: the police power model and the parens patriae
model. See generally id. at 678-746. Statutes rooted in the state’s police powers permit
the commitment of a person who “as a result of mental illness . . . is dangerous to others or to self.” Id. at 670 (internal quotation marks omitted). Almost every state has a
civil commitment law based on the police power model. Approximately twenty-five
states also have parens patriae commitment laws, which “permit commitment of a mentally ill person who is shown to be, as a result of mental illness, unable to provide for
his or her basic needs, gravely disabled or likely to deteriorate.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted).
92
Morris, supra note 80, at 1113.
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drugs, and remain in the county and/or state at all times. These
stringent requirements, combined with the fact that conditional release decisions are often made in an arbitrary and unconstitutional
94
manner, render the conditional release system more punitive than
95
rehabilitative.
Although parole and conditional release are theoretically dis96
tinct, in practice they are sometimes indistinguishable. For example,
studies have shown that insanity acquittees who committed homicide
are kept on conditional release for longer periods of time than per97
sons acquitted of less serious crimes. As Professor Grant H. Morris
has noted, “[p]erhaps these data suggest that decisions to retain patients in [conditional release] are unduly influenced by a charge of
98
homicide that resulted in an insanity acquittal.” If this is so, then
93

See id. at 1092-93 (describing the general mandates of conditional release programs).
94
See supra text accompanying notes 79-91 (describing how revocation decisions
are often made without regard for the constitutional requirement that the state may
only exercise control over insanity acquittees who are both mentally ill and dangerous).
95
The primary purpose of a punitive system is to punish an offender for committing a specific crime. See generally REISNER ET AL., supra note 54, at 525-27 (discussing
rationales for criminal punishment based on the commission of a particular act). Systems that govern the release of insanity acquittees may not be punitive in nature because the acquittee has not been found guilty of committing a crime and therefore
may not be punished. Rather, one of the main reasons the acquittee is confined is so
that she may be rehabilitated. See id. at 530-31 (implying that confinement provides for
rehabilitation and incapacitation). Rehabilitation focuses on helping the acquittee
through counseling, medication, training, etc., to change her behavior so that she may
be safely reintegrated into society.
96
See Bergstein v. State, 588 A.2d 779, 783-84 (Md. 1991) (“[T]here are significant
differences between . . . conditional release and . . . parole or probation. Parole and
probation are essentially a product of punitive sanctions imposed for the commission
of a criminal act . . . . Conditional release, however, is not a tool of the penal system.
Rather, it is a therapeutic release . . . .” (citations omitted)).
97
See Morris, supra note 80, at 1083-84 (noting the high proportion of CONREP
patients who were acquitted of homicide as opposed to other crimes).
98
Id. It is certainly possible that insanity acquittees who committed homicide suffer from more severe and pervasive mental disorders and are therefore more dangerous than acquittees who commit minor offenses. However, courts sometimes consider
the fact that the acquittee committed a homicide to be the “foremost” piece of evidence in assessing the acquittee’s current dangerousness. See, e.g., Warren v. Harvey,
632 F.2d 925, 934 (2d Cir. 1980) (pointing out that the acquittee had already “committed the most extreme form of violence”); State v. Perez, 563 So. 2d 841, 845 (La. 1990)
(“When the crime is a serious one like murder, a court should be especially cautious
before releasing an insanity acquittee.”). These courts will also discount the fact that a
homicidal acquittee has not behaved violently while committed, noting that the acquittee has been in custody and thus her dangerousness cannot be properly assessed. See,
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states are employing conditional release as a punitive—rather than a
rehabilitative—means of dealing with acquittees. This approach directly conflicts with the Supreme Court’s holding in Jones:
[Because the acquittee] was not convicted, he may not be punished. His
confinement rests on his continuing illness and dangerousness. Thus,
. . . no matter how serious the act committed by the acquittee, he may be
released . . . if he has recovered. In contrast, one who committed a less
serious act may be confined for a longer period if he remains ill and
dangerous. There simply is no necessary correlation between severity of
99
the offense and length of time necessary for recovery.

Thus, although conditional release seems to be a practical solution to the problem of insanity acquittee recidivism, certain release
statutes violate the constitutional standards for acquittee commitment
established in Jones and Foucha and are impermissibly penal in nature.
B. Approaches that Attack the Validity of the Insanity Defense Itself
The second general category of approaches to reducing insanity
acquittee recidivism entails modification of the insanity defense itself.
Modifications include adoption of the guilty but mentally ill (GBMI)
verdict and complete abolishment of the insanity defense.
1. The Adoption of the Guilty but Mentally Ill Verdict
In response to highly publicized violent acts of recidivism commit100
ted by insanity acquittees, several states adopted the GBMI verdict as
101
an alternative to a finding of legal insanity.
The GBMI verdict per-

e.g., Warren, 632 F.2d at 934 (“[T]he lack of evidence that appellant has engaged in
more recent violent acts or threats must be viewed in light of the fact that he has been
in custody ever since he killed his neighbor.”). Although the commission of a prior
violent act is certainly probative of current dangerousness, it cannot be the sole piece
of evidence relied upon by courts. If that were the case, then acquittees who committed homicide would be deemed perpetually dangerous, regardless of the strides they
made while committed. The fact that some courts rely on an acquittee’s prior homicide as the “foremost” piece of evidence in assessing an acquittee’s current dangerousness suggests that the motivation behind the confinement may be more punitive than
rehabilitative.
99
Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 369 (1983) (footnote omitted).
100
See supra text accompanying notes 1-7 (discussing violent recidivist acts by two
insanity acquittees and the resulting public outcry).
101
For statutes defining the GBMI verdict, see, for example, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
504.130 (LexisNexis 1999); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.36 (West 2000); 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 314 (West 2002); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-24-20 (2003); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 23A-26-14 (2004).
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mits a jury to find that a defendant is mentally ill, yet criminally re102
sponsible for the crime charged.
The defendant must then receive
103
proper psychological treatment while imprisoned.
The GBMI verdict is a “useless, confusing alternative” to the insan104
ity defense.
A mentally ill defendant who does not meet the legal
criteria for insanity and is convicted of a crime will receive psychopharmacological treatment in prison regardless of the availability of a
105
GBMI verdict.
Thus, there is no meaningful distinction between a
defendant who receives a GBMI verdict and one who receives a
straightforward guilty verdict. In fact, in some jurisdictions, a person
106
receiving a GBMI verdict may even be executed.
The only plausible explanation for the widespread adoption of the
GBMI verdict is that legislatures hope it will induce juries to return
GBMI verdicts in cases where they ordinarily would have acquitted the
107
defendant by reason of insanity.
“[I]mpermissibly allow[ing] juries

102

See, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 314(a) (West 2002) (“A person . . . may be
found ‘guilty but mentally ill’ at trial if the trier of fact finds, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the person is guilty of an offense, was mentally ill at the time of the commission of the offense and was not legally insane at th[at] time . . . .”).
103
See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9727(b) (West 2002) (“An offender who is
severely mentally disabled and in need of treatment at the time of sentencing shall,
consistent with available resources, be provided such treatment as is psychiatrically or
psychologically indicated for his mental illness.”).
104
Stephen J. Morse, Excusing and the New Excuse Defenses: A Legal and Conceptual
Review, 23 CRIME & JUST. 329, 401 (1998). According to Professor Christopher Slobogin, proponents of the GBMI verdict contend that it will (1) “reduce, if not eliminate,
inappropriate insanity acquittals”; (2) “prevent, or at least postpone, the further commission of violent acts by mentally ill individuals”; (3) “assur[e] more effective treatment for mentally ill offenders”; and (4) “discourag[e] the insanity plea” thereby
minimizing battles between experts. Slobogin, supra note 7, at 505. For an analysis of
the GBMI verdict’s failure to fulfill these goals, see id. at 506-17.
105
See Slobogin, supra note 7, at 512-13 (providing examples from Illinois and
Indiana of laws requiring the Department of Corrections to provide psychiatric treatment for prisoners who require it); see also Gare A. Smith & James A. Hall, Evaluating
Michigan’s Guilty but Mentally Ill Verdict: An Empirical Study, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 77,
104-05 (1982) (finding that the “GBMI prisoner is not more likely to receive mental
health treatment than the prisoner with a simple guilty verdict; the GBMI prisoner in
Michigan is tested and evaluated like any other prisoner” (footnote omitted)).
106
See People v. Crews, 522 N.E.2d 1167, 1172-75 (Ill. 1988) (holding that a verdict
of guilty but mentally ill does not preclude the trial judge from sentencing a defendant
to death because GBMI is not the equivalent of an insanity plea and the legislature did
not intend such preclusion).
107
Although one of the goals of the GBMI verdict is to decrease the number of
“not guilty by reason of insanity” verdicts, research suggests that “most defendants
found GBMI would probably have received guilty verdicts in the absence of the GBMI
statute.” Smith & Hall, supra note 105, at 104.
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to avoid finding a defendant not guilty by reason of insanity in cases in
108
which legal insanity appears justified” is an inappropriate means of
reducing insanity acquittee recidivism. If the insanity defense is available and the defendant meets the requisite criteria, then she should
be able to take full advantage of it. The GBMI verdict distracts juries
from evaluating the appropriateness of the insanity defense in a particular case and dupes them into believing that they are striking a fair
balance between public safety and the mental health needs of the defendant. In reality, they may be imprisoning defendants who do not
meet the requirements for criminal responsibility.
2. Complete Abolishment of the Insanity Defense
Four states have completely abolished the insanity defense and
109
admit evidence of mental illness only to negate mens rea. Complete
abolishment of the insanity defense is an overreaction to the recidivism problem. It fails to take into account the fact that some offenders are truly not capable of rational thought and are thus unable to be
deterred by the criminal law. In an effort to protect public safety,
such an approach utterly ignores the mental capacity of the offender
and inappropriately attaches criminal blame and punishment to undeserving defendants.
Admitting evidence of mental illness to negate criminal intent is
an inadequate replacement for the insanity defense. To be acquitted
under this approach, a defendant must establish that her mental incapacity prevented her from formulating the requisite mens rea to
110
commit the crime. The classic example is the man who strangles his
108

Morse, supra note 104, at 401.
Kansas, Montana, Idaho, and Utah have passed legislation abolishing the insanity defense and providing that evidence of mental illness may only be admitted to negate a defendant’s mens rea. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-207 (2004) (establishing a
mental disease or defect as defenses to prosecution insofar as they negate the mental
state element(s) of the crime charged); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3220 (1995) (same);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-102 (2003) (same); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-305 (West
2003) (same). The highest court of each of the four states has upheld the constitutionality of the abolishment. See State v. Searcy, 798 P.2d 914, 919 (Idaho 1990) (ruling that the availability of the insanity defense is not guaranteed by the state constitution); State v. Bethel, 66 P.3d 840, 851 (Kan. 2003) (same); State v. Korell, 690 P.2d
992, 1002 (Mont. 1984) (same); State v. Herrera, 895 P.2d 359, 366 (Utah 1995)
(same). But see Finger v. State, 27 P.3d 66, 80 (Nev. 2001) (finding that the abolishment of the insanity defense violated federal due process).
110
See Marc Rosen, Student Article, Insanity Denied: Abolition of the Insanity Defense
in Kansas, 8 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 253, 255 (1999) (“This approach permits a defendant to introduce expert psychiatric witnesses or evidence to litigate the intent ele109
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wife to death, but—as a result of mental illness—believes that he is
111
squeezing a lemon. His mental illness prevents him from possessing
the intent to kill, and the mens rea necessary for homicide is negated.
But in reality, “defendants rarely lack mens rea because they believe
112
they are squeezing a lemon.”
Rather, most mentally ill defendants
commit crimes intentionally, but do so for crazy reasons (e.g., they
113
heard voices commanding them to kill).
Thus, the mens rea approach is an unsatisfactory alternative to the insanity defense and “unfairly punishes people who are completely unable to understand the
114
nature and consequences of their actions.”
*

*

*

Thus far, I have examined five approaches adopted by states to
reduce insanity acquittee recidivism. The first three approaches aim
at ensuring that insanity acquittees abide by their medication regimen
115
after release.
I concluded that evaluating acquittees in an unmedicated state when making release decisions is both impractical and inequitable. The remaining two methods (taking medication compliance into account when assessing the dangerousness of an acquittee
and implementing conditional release programs) are effective means
of reducing insanity acquittee recidivism, but only if they are applied
in an equitable fashion and in accordance with constitutional
116
norms.
In addition, I have concluded that the two methods that attack the
validity of the insanity defense itself (the GBMI verdict and the com117
plete abolition of the insanity defense) are inadequate.
Studies of
the GBMI verdict demonstrate that it does not alter the number of in-

ments of the crime. If the evidence negates the requisite intent, the defendant is entitled to an acquittal.”).
111
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 cmt. 2 (1980) (providing the lemon example).
112
Rosen, supra note 110, at 261 (emphasis omitted).
113
See id. at 261 (“[E]vidence of mental disease or defect would still be of no help
since the hearing of voices has nothing to do with whether [a defendant] acted with
intent, purposefully or knowingly.”); see also, Stephen J. Morse, Excusing the Crazy: The
Insanity Defense Reconsidered, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 777, 801-02 (1985) (“[V]irtually all crazy
persons know, in the strictest sense, what they are doing and intend to do it. A person
who kills another because of a delusional belief is aware of killing a human being and
does so intentionally.”).
114
Rosen, supra note 110, at 262.
115
See supra Part II.A.1.a–b, II.A.2.
116
See supra Part II.A.1.b, II.A.2.
117
See supra Part II.B.1–2.
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dividuals found not guilty by reason of insanity, and thus it has no ef118
fect on the rate of insanity acquittee recidivism.
Even if the GBMI
verdict reduced the number of acquittals by reason of insanity, it
would do so at the unjustifiable cost of imprisoning individuals who
are not criminally responsible for their actions. Similarly, abolishing
the insanity defense places criminal blame and punishment on an undeserving class of offenders.
III. A NEW APPROACH TO INSANITY ACQUITTEE RECIDIVISM
I propose a new means of dealing with insanity acquittee recidivism which, in conjunction with certain methods currently employed
119
by the states, would serve as an effective “external accountability
120
control[]” for acquittees. Before I set forth my proposal, it is necessary to delineate five key assumptions that I have made in its development.
A. The Assumptions
First, the insanity defense is a valid affirmative defense. Although
opponents of the insanity defense claim that it produces inaccurate
verdicts, is overused, and permits guilty people to avoid punish121
122
ment, such criticism is untenable.
In our society, “[c]onviction

118

See supra note 107 (citing research suggesting that most defendants found
GBMI would probably have received guilty verdicts in the absence of the GBMI statute). If individuals who would have otherwise been found guilty are imprisoned under
a verdict of GBMI, then it is not exerting any deterrent effect on insane acquittees.
119
Such methods include implementing conditional release programs that are
constitutionally appropriate or assessing the acquittee’s dangerousness on the basis of
firm evidence and only when the issue is constitutionally relevant. See, e.g., supra note
79 (arguing that Hawaii’s conditional release statute meets the constitutional requirements as set forth in Foucha); cf. supra text accompanying notes 64-70 (discussing
courts’ use of medication compliance evidence in determining whether an acquittee
should be conditionally released).
120
State v. Dudley, 903 S.W.2d 581, 587 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995).
121
For example, former Attorney General Edwin Meese argued that abolishing the
insanity defense would “rid . . . the streets of some of the most dangerous people that
are out there and committing a disproportionate number of crimes.” See MICHAEL L.
PERLIN, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE 18 (1994) (quoting Reagan Adviser Meese Enunciates Administration’s Crime Control Goals, 12 CRIM. JUST. NEWSLETTER 4
(1981)).
122
See id. at 73-142, 229-62 (1994) (explaining why avoidance of punishment is an
erroneously perceived result of the insanity defense); see also Morse, supra note 113, at
797 (“Insanity acquittals are far too infrequent to communicate the message that the
criminal justice system is ‘soft’ or fails to protect society.”).
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and punishment are justified only if the defendant deserves them.”
The “actor’s responsibility as a moral agent” is a “basic precondition
124
for desert.”
Thus, if a person, because of a severe mental illness,
does not possess the requisite capacity for rationality, she cannot be
considered responsible for her actions or deserving of criminal blame
and punishment. The insanity defense properly reflects the notion
that a defendant whose mental disorder renders her irresponsible is
not in fact culpable.
Second, there are genuine differences between convicting a defendant and sending her to jail, and acquitting a defendant by reason
of insanity and hospitalizing her. In the case of the convicted defendant, society has deemed her criminally responsible for her actions.
Because she is fully culpable for her behavior, society may “extinguish” her “right to freedom from confinement” and imprison her for
125
an established period of time.
The insanity acquittee, however, has
been found criminally nonresponsible. The state may confine the acquittee—not because she is culpable, but because she is nonresponsi126
bly dangerous.
The length of her commitment will not depend on
127
the severity of the crime she committed.
Rather, it will “rest[] on
128
[her] continuing illness and dangerousness.”
The distinction between criminal conviction and acquittee hospitalization is significant,
and it plays an indispensable role in my proposal.
Third, insanity and dangerousness are two distinct concepts. Admittedly, at the time of initial commitment, an acquittee is presumably
129
both insane and dangerous.
However, by the time the state consid-

123

Id. at 781.
Id.
125
Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493-94 (1980).
126
See supra text accompanying notes 76-77, 99 (explaining that acquittees may
only be confined so long as they are both mentally ill and dangerous).
127
Although this statement is true in theory, it is not always so in practice. See
Ronald Roesch & James R.P. Ogloff, Settings for Providing Criminal and Civil Forensic
Mental Health Services, in MENTAL HEALTH AND LAW, supra note 51, at 191, 199 (noting
a study that compared the length of time for which insanity acquittees were confined
to the sentences of defendants who were found guilty after raising the insanity defense,
and that the study found that insanity acquittees, with the exception of murder cases,
were “confined for considerably longer periods of time”). Some state statutes explicitly
provide that “commitment of acquittees be limited to the maximum sentence the acquittee would have received had he or she been found responsible for the crime
charged.” REISNER ET AL., supra note 54, at 842.
128
Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 369 (1983).
129
See id. at 363-64 (“A verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity establishes two
facts: (i) the defendant committed an act that constitutes a criminal offense, and (ii)
124
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ers whether or not to release the acquittee, it is perfectly plausible that
she may be sane and dangerous, or insane and nondangerous. Although states sometimes take one factor into account in assessing the
existence of the other (e.g., the acquittee is still mentally ill—
therefore, she must also still be dangerous), this approach is neither
130
required nor appropriate in all cases.
The distinction between sanity and dangerousness is particularly important to the validity of my
proposal because my proposal only applies to those acquittees pronounced sane at the time of release. Thus, if an acquittee is deemed
mentally ill but nondangerous upon release, my proposal would not
131
govern her post-release recidivism.
Fourth, my proposal only reaches acquittees who are mentally ill
when they recidivate. Acquittees who maintain their sanity but continue to commit crimes after release are quite clearly responsible and
should be dealt with according to the standard rules of the criminal
justice system.
Fifth, I am presuming that the prima facie case of the recidivist
crime the acquittee is charged with has been proven. Thus, the only
element in dispute is whether the acquittee possesses a valid affirmative defense based upon her mental state at the time of the crime.
B. The Proposal: Abolishing the Insanity Defense for
Certain Acquittee Recidivists
My basic proposal is the following: if an insanity acquittee, who is
judged sane at the time of release from PIAC, subsequently commits a
crime while mentally ill, she will be unable to raise the insanity defense.
he committed the act because of mental illness. . . . [T]hese findings constitute an
adequate basis for hospitalizing the acquittee as a dangerous and mentally ill person.”).
130
See Carlisle v. State, 512 So. 2d 150, 160 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987) (ordering the
release of a mentally ill but nondangerous acquittee).
131
I believe, however, that in practice states release very few acquittees whom they
consider to be insane but nondangerous. Accurate dangerousness predictions are very
difficult to make. Clinicians will often overpredict dangerousness, “especially when the
consequence of a finding of dangerousness is that an obviously mentally ill patient will
remain within their control.” Carlisle, 512 So. 2d at 159 (quoting Jones, 463 U.S. at 37879) (internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, the mental stability of an acquittee is often a factor considered in making the dangerousness prediction itself.
Thus, although no data are currently available on this issue, I contend that nondangerous, mentally ill acquittees make up a small minority of acquittees released from
PIAC. The scope of my proposal, then, is still quite broad and will effectively reach
most acquittee recidivists.
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Generally, when an insanity acquittee is released, she has been
132
deemed sane by the state.
This finding of sanity entails a recognition that the acquittee now possesses the capacity for rationality and
133
the ability to be guided by reason.
In this rational state, the acquittee is capable of comprehending that she previously committed a
crime while suffering from a severe mental disorder, and, if proper
precautions are not taken, that she may potentially become insane
134
(and dangerous) again.
Accordingly, she must take all steps within
her power to prevent herself from deteriorating into a state of mental
instability. My proposal would require the acquittee to abide by the
following mandates upon release from PIAC.
First, the acquittee must strictly adhere to the treatment regimen
that was developed for her while she was hospitalized. Medication
compliance is the single most important factor in avoiding mental ill135
ness relapse.
Thus, even if the acquittee dislikes the side effects of
136
her medication, she must continue to take it.
She must also comply
with any other form of treatment that her doctors have prescribed for

132

See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text.
Cf. Benjamin B. Sendor, Crime as Communication: An Interpretive Theory of the Insanity Defense and the Mental Elements of Crime, 74 GEO. L.J. 1371, 1391 n.95 (1986) (explaining that a legally insane defendant must lack “rationality [with regard to] the
conduct with which he is criminally charged” (citing HERBERT FINGARETTE, THE MEANING OF CRIMINAL INSANITY 210-11 (1972))).
134
It is often asserted that many mentally ill people (particularly schizophrenics)
do not have insight into their disorders, and thus do not believe they are mentally ill.
See Manahan, supra note 44, at 20 & n.123 (noting that many mentally ill people are
not aware of their mental illness). This should not be a concern for the group of acquittees my proposal is targeting. Once an acquittee has regained her sanity she is capable of rational thought and will thus be able to understand the effects of her illness
and the proper ways to manage them.
135
See id. at 20 (“Systems that are successful in keeping individuals with mental illness out of the hospital have found medication compliance to be the single most important factor in achieving such success.”).
136
I am not minimizing the side effects that a patient may suffer from antipsychotic medication. However, the advent of atypical antipsychotic medications, which
have a lower risk of the side effects that are generally associated with traditional medicines, provides patients with less-unpleasant options. See REISNER ET AL., supra note 54,
at 28-29, 948-49 (discussing the impact of the new antipsychotic medications on rightto-refuse jurisprudence); SPEAKING, supra note 52, at 18 (explaining that newer antipsychotic drugs have a lower risk of tardive dyskinesia, a serious side effect of traditional
medicines). Furthermore, “[a]lthough the side effects of medications for treatment of
mental disorders are real and should not be underestimated, the overall benefit of the
effectiveness of such medication in helping people with mental illness live as nondangerous, functioning members of society seems to outweigh the side effects’ negative impact.” Manahan, supra note 44, at 20.
133
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her (e.g., participating in cognitive behavioral therapy, self-help
groups, or vocational training).
In addition to rigorously adhering to a specified treatment regimen, the acquittee must actively work to eliminate any potentially destabilizing risk factors from her life. She must refrain from drinking
137
138
139
alcohol, ingesting narcotics, and smoking nicotine.
Regular at140
tendance at either school or work would also be mandatory.
The state will expect the acquittee to cooperate fully with the
above directives, and to take an active, responsible role in preserving
her own mental health. If the acquittee fails to do so, and she recidivates, the state will hold her criminally responsible, even though she
may be insane at the time of the recidivist crime. Her criminal re141
sponsibility lies not in the commission of the crime itself, but rather
in her failure to take the necessary precautions to avoid going insane
again.
Several courts have adopted a similar approach in dealing with
epileptic drivers. An epileptic who is aware of her condition and suffers from a seizure while driving may be held liable for any resulting
142
accidents.
An epileptic, of course, is not responsible in the tradi137

See Rice & Harris, supra note 13, at 405 (“Alcohol has been found to be related
to criminality and especially to violence in a number of . . . studies.” (citation omitted)).
138
See SPEAKING, supra note 52, at 8 (stating that substance abuse can both exacerbate the symptoms of, and reduce the effectiveness of treatment for, schizophrenia).
139
See id. (“[S]moking has been found to interfere with the [patient’s] response to
antipsychotic drugs.”).
140
See Rice et al., supra note 51, at 177 (noting that “attendance at school or [a]
job [has been] listed by clinicians as a recommended security precaution” for some
forensic patients).
141
I am assuming that the acquittee is insane at the time she recidivates. Thus,
she lacks the capacity for rationality at the time of the crime. She, therefore, will not
be responsible in the traditional sense for the commission of the crime.
142
See, e.g., Holcomb v. Miller, 269 N.E.2d 885, 887-88 (Ind. Ct. App. 1971) (en
banc) (holding that in order for an epileptic defendant’s seizure to “effectively excuse
her failure to control the vehicle, [she] must . . . show[] by a preponderance of the
evidence [that it] occurred without fair warning or under such circumstances as to preclude her from taking reasonable precautions”); Martino v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 351
So. 2d 204, 204-05 (La. Ct. App. 1977) (“Where it has been demonstrated that drivers
have had prior blackout experience from epileptic convulsion . . . the courts have
found negligence based on foreseeability.” (footnotes omitted)); People v. Decina, 152
N.Y.S.2d 169, 171 (App. Div. 1956) (stating that awareness of a foreseeable condition
that will “deprive [one] of effective control over the operation of [her] vehicle” is sufficient for responsibility); Vinci v. Heimbach, Nos. 73440, 73464, 1998 WL 895381, at
*3 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 17, 1998) (“[C]ontinued driving, with knowledge of a diagnosed epileptic condition and prior seizures, would provide sufficient evidence of ig-
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tional sense; she is unconscious at the time of the seizure and thus is
neither negligent nor reckless during the accident itself. Both negligence and recklessness presuppose voluntary action. Nonetheless, the
epileptic is deemed responsible for failing to do everything within her
power before the accident to avoid a grave risk of which she was consciously aware—the risk of having a seizure while driving. “It suffices
if [an epileptic] is aware of a condition which will deprive [her] of effective control over the operation of the vehicle and can foresee that
143
such condition is likely to occur.”
Similarly, the acquittee should be held responsible because of her
conscious failure to avoid the serious risk of becoming insane again
and recidivating. Like the epileptic who is aware of her medical history, the insanity acquittee is deemed to be on notice of her potential
mental instability, and she must take the appropriate steps to guard
against it.
C. Exceptions to the Proposal
Under my proposal, not all insanity acquittee recidivists will be
considered criminally responsible. To be deemed nonresponsible,
and thus to be able to assert the insanity defense, an acquittee must
have (1) rigorously abided by her prescribed treatment regimen yet
decompensated, (2) lapsed from the treatment regimen through no
fault of her own, or (3) committed a crime which truly was not foreseeable.
Although it is true that medication noncompliance is the primary
144
reason that mentally ill individuals relapse, a person’s mental condition may deteriorate for an array of inexplicable reasons. Antipsychotic medication is extremely effective in treating most psychotic
disorders, but it is not foolproof. Thus, an acquittee may suffer a re145
lapse even though she consistently takes her medication.
If the acquittee can successfully establish that she rigidly adhered to her
course of treatment, yet still mentally deteriorated, she will be able to
assert the affirmative defense of insanity.
noring a foreseeable risk to recover on a claim of negligence if the condition is untreated or the driver ignores his physician’s warnings or advice.”).
143
Decina, 152 N.Y.S.2d at 171.
144
See Manahan, supra note 44, at 20 (asserting that medication compliance is essential to prevent relapse).
145
See SPEAKING, supra note 52, at 15-16 (stating that although relapses of mental
illness are more likely to occur when “antipsychotic medications are discontinued or
taken irregularly,” patients who continue their drug treatment may suffer relapses).
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The second exception requires an insanity acquittee to demonstrate that she is not responsible for her failure to follow her treatment regimen. Take, for example, the following scenario: the acquittee is involved in a severe car accident and is hospitalized. The
hospital doctors negligently fail to provide the acquittee with her antipsychotic medication, despite her requests for it. The acquittee
quickly begins to decompensate and by the time she is released from
the hospital she has lost all insight into her disorder and no longer believes that she needs medication to function properly. Under such
circumstances, the acquittee is truly not responsible for her noncompliance, and she would be able to raise the insanity defense.
Finally, if an insanity acquittee commits a crime that she could not
have reasonably foreseen to be a consequence of decompensation, she
cannot be deemed criminally responsible. An acquittee recidivist, like
an epileptic driver, should only be held responsible for the consequences of actions she could have foreseen and taken steps to prevent. Thus, an insanity acquittee who knows that she is prone to commit petty theft while insane should not be expected to foresee that she
might commit murder while insane. If an insanity acquittee commits
such an unforeseeable act, then she may not be held responsible and
should be able to rely on the insanity defense.
D. How to Implement the Proposal
For my proposal to operate effectively in practice, several important changes would have to be made to our current criminal justice
and PIAC systems. First, each acquittee released from PIAC would
have to receive a detailed treatment regimen, outlining the specific
medicines that she is to take and the psychiatrists and/or psycholo146
gists she is to meet with on a regular basis. The acquittee’s personal
risk factors would also have to be determined and carefully explained
147
to her so that she would be able to avoid them.
Second, states would have to take a more active role in providing
insanity acquittees with post-release mental health care services. An
acquittee can only adhere to her treatment regimen if a high-quality,
accessible regimen is firmly in place. The state, therefore, will have to

146

Currently, only acquittees who are conditionally released receive such instructions upon release. See supra Part II.A.2.
147
See supra notes 137-40 and accompanying text (pointing to alcohol, nicotine,
and poor school or work attendance as risk factors).
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ensure that it provides acquittees with the follow-up care they need in
148
order to preserve their mental health.
Finally, the provision of mental health care services in prison
would have to be significantly enhanced. Although a substantial
149
number of prisoners are mentally ill, they often fail to receive the
necessary psychological treatment in jail. If my proposal were implemented, an even larger number of those suffering from mental disorders would be incarcerated. Although imprisoning such offenders incapacitates them and attaches criminal responsibility to their actions,
it fails to adequately treat their mental illnesses. If the mental illness is
not properly treated, the dangerousness and mental instability of the
acquittee will most likely not be alleviated, and the recidivism problem
may be exacerbated. Thus, prisons will have to ensure that inmates
150
are regularly receiving the appropriate antipsychotic medication.
One potential criticism of my proposal is that prisons will become
overburdened with psychotic inmates with whom they are not
equipped to deal. The most reasonable way to manage this problem is
to treat an offender initially while she is in an acute psychotic state in
the hospital. It should not take long to stabilize her, particularly because an effective treatment regimen was previously developed for her
during PIAC. Once she has been stabilized, she can then be transferred to the prison, where she will continue to receive her regular
course of antipsychotic medication.
E. Constitutionality of the Proposal
Withholding the insanity defense from certain acquittee recidivists
is constitutional because (1) the Supreme Court has never held that
151
the insanity defense is constitutionally mandated, and (2) even if
148

If the state allows an acquittee to fall through the cracks, despite the acquittee’s
efforts to follow her regimen, the acquittee may qualify for an exception to the proposal.
149
See REISNER ET AL., supra note 54, at 844 (noting estimations that approximately
fourteen percent of convicted felons are psychotic and thirty-five percent suffer from
character disorders).
150
If an inmate refuses to voluntarily take antipsychotic medication, the state may
medicate her without her consent “if the inmate is dangerous to [herself] or others
and the treatment is in the inmate’s medical interest.” Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S.
210, 227 (1990).
151
Language of prior Supreme Court opinions “suggests rather convincingly that
[the] Court would conclude that the due process [clause] of the fifth amendment does
not require the states to provide a criminal defendant with an independent defense of
insanity.” State v. Searcy, 798 P.2d 914, 918 (Idaho 1990). The Court has consistently
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the insanity defense were constitutionally mandated, my proposal only
restricts criminally responsible recidivists from employing it.
Unlike the complete abolishment of the insanity defense and the
GBMI verdict, my proposal recognizes that the insanity defense is a
valid affirmative defense that first-time offenders are entitled to assert.
The insanity defense properly recognizes that if an individual’s mental
illness sufficiently deprives her of the capacity for rationality, then she
is not criminally blameworthy for her resultant actions. My proposal is
consistent with the basic assumption that the nonresponsibly dangerous should not be subjected to criminal blame and punishment.
Rather, my proposal recognizes that certain insanity acquittees
(i.e., those adjudged sane upon their release from PIAC) must be
compelled to take responsibility for their mental health in the interest
of public safety. Therefore, sane acquittees who willfully fail to abide
by their treatment regimen are responsible; if their mental decompensation is a result of their deliberate acts or omissions, then criminal
blame and punishment are in fact appropriate.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is often contended that “a vital function of the ‘forensic mental
health system is the safe release, after confinement and inpatient
152
treatment,’” of insanity acquittees.
The current state of insanity acquittee jurisprudence, however, requires the release of acquittees after
153
they are either no longer mentally ill or no longer dangerous.
Thus, whether or not the acquittee may be safely reintegrated into so-

emphasized that states have broad discretion in defining the substantive elements of
their crimes and affirmative defenses. In Leland v. Oregon, the Court declined to constitutionally require a particular version of the insanity defense and upheld a statute
that placed the burden of proving insanity beyond a reasonable doubt on the defendant. 343 U.S. 790, 798-90 (1952). In Powell v. Texas, the Court again stressed that
states enjoy great flexibility in developing substantive criminal law doctrines. 392 U.S.
514, 535-36 (1968). Justice Marshall further cautioned in Powell that “[n]othing could
be less fruitful than for this Court to be impelled into defining some sort of insanity
test in constitutional terms.” Id. at 536. Marshall’s sentiment was later echoed by Justice Rehnquist in his dissenting opinion in Ake v. Oklahoma: “It is highly doubtful that
due process requires a State to make available an insanity defense to a criminal defendant . . . .” 470 U.S. 68, 91 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
152
Harris, supra note 11, at 228 (ellipsis omitted) (quoting Mark R. Wiederanders
et al., Forensic Conditional Release Programs and Outcomes in Three States, 20 INT’L J.L. &
PSYCHIATRY 249, 249 (1997)).
153
See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text (discussing Foucha v. Louisiana,
504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992), and Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 370 (1983)).
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ciety may not always be the determinative factor in a release deci154
sion.
An insanity acquittee’s adherence to an appropriate regime of
155
medication is vital in preventing recidivism.
Therefore, in order to
minimize post-release acquittee recidivism, medication compliance
must be ensured. The current methods adopted by states to deal with
this dilemma are impractical, inequitable, or unconstitutional.
My proposal is a more appropriate method of dealing with certain
insanity acquittee recidivists than is rehospitalization. First, there are
distinct differences between incarcerating an offender and commit156
ting her to a state mental institution.
In the case of imprisonment,
the offender is deemed criminally responsible; in the case of hospi157
talization, she is not.
To the extent that one believes criminal responsibility reflects society’s judgment of a person’s moral blameworthiness and culpability, this distinction is important. Under my
proposal, the acquittee should be forced to take a certain degree of
responsibility for her own mental health. If she willfully fails to do so,
she should not receive the benefit of the “not guilty” verdict.
Additionally, permitting only the truly nonresponsible recidivists
to employ the insanity defense may deter acquittees more effectively
than the threat of rehospitalization and thereby reduce acquittee recidivism. If an acquittee is aware that failure to take her medication
may result in imprisonment, she may be more inclined to abide by the
prescribed treatment regimen. Although the threat of rehospitalization may also induce the acquittee to comply with her course of medication, the hospital is a more familiar environment for most acquittees
158
and thus a less worrisome possibility.

154

See, e.g., Foucha, 504 U.S. at 85-86 (holding that Louisiana had to release an acquittee who was no longer mentally ill, but still dangerous).
155
See supra note 44 (citing an argument on the importance of medication compliance).
156
See supra notes 125-28 and accompanying text (outlining the distinction between incarceration and hospitalization).
157
See Jones, 463 U.S. at 369 (“As [the acquittee] was not convicted, he may not be
punished.”).
158
It is important to reiterate that my proposal is based on the assumption that at
the time of her release from PIAC, the acquittee is sane and thus capable of rational
thought. At that point in time, she is fully able to evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of continuing to take her medication.
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Furthermore, because of the undefined nature and duration of
159
PIAC,
rehospitalization often results in the “revolving-door” pa160
tient.
Once an acquittee regains her sanity or is no longer danger161
ous, the state must release her.
If there is no method of ensuring
that the acquittee continues to take her medication after release, she
may quickly become insane again, recidivate, and be rehospitalized.
The advent of antipsychotic medication accelerates the cycle because
the sanity of acquittees can be quickly restored in the hospital, leading
162
to shorter, but perhaps more frequent, hospital stays.
163
If an acquittee is particularly dangerous while insane, this sequence of events is all the more troubling. My proposal addresses this
problem in two respects. First, by threatening acquittees with punitive
sanctions, the proposal will likely enhance medication compliance
and thus reduce the likelihood that acquittees will recidivate. Second,
by incarcerating certain acquittee recidivists, it ensures that they are
incapacitated for a fixed period of time, thereby minimizing the
number of “revolving-door” acquittees.
Ultimately, my proposal compels insanity acquittees to take responsibility for their own mental health. I am by no means suggesting
that the mentally ill are responsible for having a mental illness.
Rather, I am asserting that when their mental illness causes them to
be dangerous, the acquittees must bear some of the costs and take all
conceivable precautions to prevent themselves from decompensating
and placing society at risk again.

159

See Jones, 463 U.S. at 370 (holding that the duration of PIAC depends on the
concurrent presence of mental illness and dangerousness).
160
See Wisor, supra note 45, at 159-60 (explaining that once a stabilized patient is
released, she may stop taking her medications, requiring rehospitalization).
161
See Foucha, 504 U.S. at 86 (holding that a person who is no longer mentally ill
must be released, even if she is still dangerous) .
162
See Wisor, supra note 45, at 160 (“Past studies indicate that as many as forty percent of patients released from state hospitals can be expected to need rehospitalization
within six months.” (footnote omitted)).
163
But note that some research indicates that “people with mental illness are no
more dangerous as a class than the general population,” although “[m]ore recent research is inconclusive on this point.” REISNER ET AL., supra note 54, at 682-83.

